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After dominating Latin American states for over a century, the Calvo
Doctrine has been widely described as "dead,"' particularly in the wake of
the global tide of economic liberalization that began in the 1990s.
However, some recent moves within and beyond Latin America suggest
that this principle is not dead, but on the resurgence. The "Revival of
Calvo" phenomenon signals a change of direction in international
investment law: neo-liberalism no longer dominates international
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As early as 1955 Shea pronounced the Calvo Doctrine's death in light of its rejection by
European and North American States. See DONALD SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE: A PROBLEM
OF INTER-AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 20 (UNIV. OF MINN. PRESS,
1955). More recently, Giesze wrote that, "[a]s a practical matter, the Calvo doctrine is a
dead letter in the overwhelming majority of Latin American countries." Craig R. Giesze,
Helms-Burton in Light of the Common Law and Civil Law Legal Traditions: Is Legal
Analysis Alone Sufficient to Settle Controversies Arising Under International Law on the Eve
of the Second Summit of the Americas?, 32 INT'L LAW. 51, 77 (1998) (emphasis added).
Shihata also considers the Calvo Doctrine less relevant in the current world. See Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID
and MIGA, I ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L. J. 1, 24 (1986). In an article published in 1995,
Manning-Cabrol pronounced the "imminent death" of the Calvo Clause. See Denise
Manning-Cabrol, The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause and the Rebirth of the Calvo
Principle: Equality of Foreign and National Investors, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1169,
1169 (1995).
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investment law-making, and a more balanced, and perhaps also a more
conservative and nationalistic approach, is gaining ground.
This Article explores these recent events and analyzes to what extent
the Calvo Doctrine is returning, as well as how the ideology of international
investment law is changing. The Article proceeds in four parts. Parts I and
II examine the events signaling the revival of the Calvo Doctrine within
Latin America and the changing trend in international investment law
beyond. Part III explores the future of the international investment regime
by critically examining both the Calvo Doctrine and the neo-liberalist
investment regime. Part IV concludes by arguing that the main theme in
international investment law-making is being shifted from a "North-South
Divide" towards a "Private-Public Debate."
I. REVIVAL OF THE CALVO DOCTRINE: WITHIN LATIN AMERICA
For over a hundred years, Latin American states adhered to the Calvo
Doctrine, named after Carlos Calvo, a nineteenth century Argentine
international lawyer and diplomat. The Doctrine essentially asserts "two
concepts of non-intervention and absolute equality of foreigners with
nationals, '2 with emphasis placed on the rejection of the superiority or
imperial prerogatives of powerful states and their nationals. The Doctrine
can be further broken into three key elements, namely an "anti-super-
national-treatment" standard, exclusive local jurisdiction, and the exclusion
of diplomatic protection.3 The Latin American states "enthusiastically
received" this doctrine and implemented it in their constitutions, domestic
legislation, international treaties and contracts signed between foreign
investors and Latin American governments, 4 even though its validity was
denied in Europe and North America. 5 The early influence of the Calvo
Doctrine went well beyond Latin America and won wide support in the
developing world, particularly in the new states emerging in Asia and
Africa during the decolonization process. It was even incorporated into
United Nations General Assembly ("UNGA") resolutions when the New
International Economic Order ("NIEO") movement reached its peak.6
2 See SHEA, supra note 1, at 19-20.
3 See Wenhua Shan, Is Calvo Dead?, 54 Am. J. CoMp. L. (forthcoming 2007), § 1. 1; see
also Manning-Cabrol, supra note 1, at 1173.
4 See SHEA, supra note 1, at 21-32.
5 The Calvo Doctrine failed to gain the support of international lawyers in Europe and the
United States in part because acceptance of the Doctrine "would eliminate the abuses of
diplomatic protection, [but] it would also eliminate the institution itself, without substituting
an acceptable alternative." SHEA, supra note 1, at 20.
6 Lillich noted that Latin American efforts on the Charter were "no more than a thinly-
disguised attempt to endow the Calvo Doctrine." Richard Lillich, The Diplomatic Protection
of Nationals Abroad: An Elementary Principle of International Law Under Attack, 69 Am. J.
INT'L L. 359, 361 (1975). Other commentators considered the Calvo doctrine "a central
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The influence of the Calvo Doctrine was severely challenged by the
global wave of economic liberalization, which reached its height in 1990s.
As a result, some commentators assumed or predicted that the Doctrine was
already dead.7  The challenges to Calvo came primarily from the
proliferation of international investment treaties, especially the bilateral
investment treaties ("BITs") entered into by Latin American states. The
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") Statistics show
that Latin American states did not engage in BITs until the late 1980s. 8 By
the end of 1990s, Latin American states had entered into a total of 300
BITs, among which ninety-three percent were signed in the 1990s.9 At a
regional level, Mercosur followed the BIT approach l° and the Andean Pact
("ANCOM") has been revised to accommodate member states' need of
flexibility in departing from the Calvo Doctrine." Most Latin American
plank of the new International Economic Order (UNGA 3171 of 1973) and the U.N. Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States (1974)." David Schneiderman, Investment Rules
and The New Constitutionalism, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757, 766 (Summer 2000); see also
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime, 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 373, 384 (1998) (noting the United Nations' adoption of Resolution 3201,
which contained "a Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order.").
7 See supra note 1.
8 U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD], Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-
1999, 15, UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (Dec. 15, 2000) (prepared by Abraham Negash), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, BITs]. According
to UNCTAD, however, the total number of BITs concluded by Latin American and
Caribbean states reached 451 by the end of 2004. UNCTAD, Recent Developments in
International Investment Agreements, 2, IIA MONITOR No. 2,
UNCTADIWEB/ITE/IIT/2005/1 (Aug. 30, 2005), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/
docs/webiteiit2005 Il.en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements].
9 UNCTAD, BITs, supra note 8.
'0 Mercosur is the Common Market of the South created in 1991 by four countries in
Latin America, namely Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Mercosur adopted two
Protocols regulating investment between member states and from non member states
respectively [the Buenos Aires Protocol (extrabloc) and the Colonia Protocol (intrabloc)],
with similar language. Article 2(c) of the Protocol regulating investments from non-member
states (the Buenos Aires Protocol) provides for national treatment, MFN treatment and "just
and equitable treatment" for foreign investment. The wording for "national treatment" and
MFN treatment is in typical BIT language, which means treatment "no less favo[]rable" than
that granted to national investors or investors from other non-member states. With regard to
state-investor dispute resolution, Article 2(h) of the Protocol provides a "fork in the road"
clause, which avails investors to choose between two options: either competent courts of the
host state, or an international arbitration tribunal, which could be either an ad hoc or an
institutional tribunal. Since it uses local remedies only as a conclusive alternative to
international arbitration, it differs significantly from the Calvo principle of "exclusive local
remedies." See Protocol on Promotion and Protection of Investment Proceeding from Non-
Member Countries of the MERCOSUL, Mar. 26, 1991, available at
http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/inter/mercosul/buenos-e.asp.
11 The revision was reflected in Decision 220 and Decision 291, which respectively
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:631 (2007)
states also accepted the Convention for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States ("ICSID
Convention"), providing an international platform for arbitration of state-
investor disputes, the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency ("MIGA Convention"), recognizing rights of
subrogation, and the New York Convention for the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards ("New York Convention"),
facilitating world-wide enforcement of arbitration awards. Meanwhile,
domestic laws and regulations in Latin American states have generally been
relaxed to accept international standards and international dispute
settlement mechanisms in order to protect and promote foreign
investment. 13  Although it might be incorrect to assert that Calvo is
completely "dead," it can be argued that it had been, by and large, "de-
activated" by the network of investment treaties providing4 an international
platform for investment dispute settlement since the 1990s.' 4
The tide of investment liberalization, however, seems to have reversed
abandoned the stiff "Calvo Clause" in the previous investment code embodied in Decision
24, and opened the possibility for ANCOM member countries to accept international
standards of treatment and jurisdiction of international arbitration tribunals. See
Commission Decision 220 Replacing Decision 24, The Common Foreign Investment and
Technology Licensing Code, May 11, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 974 (1988); see also Commission
Decision 291-Common Code for the Treatment of Foreign Capital and on Trademarks,
Patents, Licenses and Royalties, Mar. 21, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1283 (1991). Article 34 of
Decision 220 provided that, "[for the settlement of disputes or conflicts deriving from direct
foreign investments or from the transfer of foreign technology, Member Countries shall
apply the provisions established in their local legislation." Commission Decision 220
Replacing Decision 24, supra. Article 2 of Decision 291 provides that "foreign investors
shall have the same rights and obligations as pertain to national investors, except as
otherwise provided in the legislation of each Member Country." Commission Decision 291,
supra.
12 Those international treaties, particularly BITs, have generally accepted non-local
remedies and general international law as the governing norms, which depart significantly
from the Calvo principle. It can indeed be argued that a "silent revolution" has taken place in
Latin America, particularly in the sense of accepting international arbitration for state-
investor disputes. See Nigel Blackaby, David M. Lindse & Andrew Spinillo, Overview of
Regional Developments, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 10 (Nigel
Blackaby, David M. Lindse & Andrew Spinillo. eds., 2002).
13 See Shan, supra note 3, § IV; see also Manning-Cabriel, supra note 1, at 1181-90;
Eduardo A. Wiesner, ANCOM: A New Attitude toward Foreign Investment?, 24 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 435, 449-64 (1993).
14 The author's survey of 9 major Latin American states' laws and regulations shows that
most of the states still stick to the Calvo principles of excluding diplomatic protection and
equal national treatment. Hence it would be incorrect to say that the Calvo Doctrine is
completely dead. However, as most Latin American states have entered into international
agreements subjecting state-investor disputes to international arbitration, the exclusion of
foreign and international remedies has been largely discarded. This supports the argument
that the Calvo Doctrine is not completely "dead," but only "de-activated." See Shan, supra
note 3, § V.
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itself in recent years. As a result the Calvo Doctrine has returned to the
world stage, particularly to Latin America. The chief indicator of the Calvo
Doctrine's revival is the dramatic increase of investment treaty-based
arbitration cases, which have forced states world-wide, particularly in Latin
America, to re-think their approach towards investment liberalization in
general and the acceptance of international arbitration in particular.
According to UNCTAD there were 219 investment treaty-based arbitration
cases by November 2005, more than two-thirds initiated since 2002.15 In
other words, an average of more than thirty cases have been initiated in
each of the last four years. Almost all of these cases have been brought by
investors against states.16  Most defendant states were developing states
(forty-seven out of sixty-one), most frequently Latin American., 7 Argentina
topped the list with forty-two cases, which accounted for nearly twenty
percent of the total caseload.' 8 Mexico followed with seventeen cases. X
Ninety-four percent of the states that had been sued two or more times were
developing states, including three more Latin American states: Ecuador
(seven), Chile (four) and Venezuela (three). Statistics from the ICSID
shows that of seventy-two cases pending before ICSID in April 2004, forty-
one were against Latin American states, nearly sixty percent of the total
number.2 °
The surge of investment treaty arbitration cases demonstrates the teeth
of BITs and puts governments across the world on notice. Latin American
states, the states with the strongest Calvo tradition, have naturally adopted,
or are contemplating adopting, measures to limit investment treaty
arbitrations and bring them under national control. This new trend is most
perceptible in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela.
A. Argentina
Argentina is the home country of Carlos Calvo, the father of the Calvo
Doctrine. However, it was also among the most enthusiastic Latin
American countries in departing from that Doctrine by entering into BITs.
15 UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Disputes Settlement, 1-2, IIA
Monitor No. 4, (UNCTADfWEB/ITE/IIT/2005/2), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/
docs/webiteiit20052_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes Settlement].
16 id.
1" Id. at 3.
18 In UNCTAD statistics, there are fourteen developed defendant states, thirty-seven
developing states, and ten Southeast European and the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS). As Southeast European and CIS states are generally developing states, the number of
developing states might be counted as forty-seven. Id. at 1-2.
19 Id.
20 See Bernardo M. Cremades, Disputes Arising out of Foreign Direct Investment in
Latin America: A New Look at the Calvo Doctrine and Other Jurisdictional Issues, 59 DISP.
RESOL. J. 78, 81 n. 8 (2004).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:631 (2007)
Indeed, Argentina signed at least fifty-eight BITs, leading the BIT league
table in Latin America. 21 The recent dramatic rise of BIT-based arbitration
cases against Argentina was triggered by Argentina's Emergency Law No.
25561, adopted in January 2002. The law, responding to an economic
crisis, declared a public emergency until December 10, 2003, froze local
tariffs, and abolished the one-to-one U.S. Dollar-Peso convertibility.22
Such measures had a significant negative impact on foreign investors who
had stakes in privatised state-owned enterprises. One commentator
observed that the net consequence of these measures for the utility
companies was "a roughly two-thirds reduction in income. 23
Because of state-investor arbitration clauses, investors began to sue the
Argentine government. Of the eighty-five cases pending before ICSID as
of February 2004, thirty-five of the cases were brought against Argentina,
accounting for nearly half of the total investment arbitration caseload
worldwide,24 a magnitude unheard of in the history of arbitration.
Currently, Argentina still has thirty-one cases pending before the ICSID,
amounting to twenty eight percent of its total caseload.2
Such a large caseload for one country constitutes a significant burden,
politically as well as financially. The average legal fee to defend a single
investment treaty-based arbitration is estimated to be $1-2 million, in
addition to which are costs for the arbitration tribunals amounting to
roughly $400,000.26 Therefore, Argentina will have to pay tens of millions
of dollars annually in order to defend these cases. Should Argentina lose
21 UNCTAD data show that Argentina signed fifty-eight BITs by June 1, 2006, which is
more than any other country in Latin America. See UNCTAD, Country Specific List of
BITs, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intltemlD=2344&lang=l, (last visited
Mar. 27, 2007).
22 Law No. 25561, Jan. 6, 2002, B.O. arts. 2-5, 8-9. For English sources see Cremades,
supra note 20, at 81; Patricia C. Mastropierro & Larry B. Pascal, ALERT: Argentine
Devaluation Law, available at http://www.haynesboone.com/knowledge/knowledge-
detail.asp?groupid=all&page=pubs&pubid=380 (last visited Mar. 27, 2007); M. & M
Bomchil Abogados, Public Emergency Regulations on Public Works and Utilities Contracts
and Licenses, available at http://www.ag-intemet.com/bullet iln-one-five/Bulletin-
ContractsLicenses.doc (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
23 Paolo Di Rosa, The Recent Wave of Arbitrations against Argentina under Bilateral
Investment Treaties: Background and Principal Legal Issues, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REv., 41, 48 (2004).
24 Id. at 43.
25 See List of Pending Cases, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
pending.htm, (last visited Mar. 27, 2007) (showing that thirty-one out of the 110 pending
cases are against Argentina).
26 The legal costs to claimants are approximately the same as for defendants. See
UNCTAD, Issues Related to Investment Arrangements: Investor-State Disputes and Policy
Implication, 7, TD/B/COM.2/62 (Jan. 14, 2005), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/
docs/c2d62_en.pdf.
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every case, it would owe compensation amounting to roughly $17 billion,27
which, as alleged by Argentina, exceeds its annual budget. 8 Facing such
severe legal challenges, Argentina has tried to cope by using procedural
tactics. 29 Meanwhile, it has challenged the constitutionality of investment
treaties and treaty-based arbitration. 30  Finally, Argentina has taken
legislative measure to tackle the problem, and is currently considering
further legislative measures.31
1. Procedural Tactics
In dealing with these cases, the Argentine government first makes
every effort to reach a negotiated settlement with the disputant investors.
32
If this fails, the Government then almost always challenges the arbitrator's
jurisdiction. So far, the Government has failed to win a single
jurisdictional challenge.34
These jurisdictional challenges have been launched on various
grounds, some of which relate to "Calvo clauses" in BITs and/or concession
agreements. In Lanco International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, a U.S.
investor sued Argentina at the ICSID, based on a "fork-in-the-road clause"
in a 1991 U.S.-Argentina BIT allowing a choice among local remedies,
agreed channels and international arbitration.3 5 The Argentine government
challenged ICSID's jurisdiction, arguing that Argentina had not given the
necessary written consent to grant the ICSID jurisdiction and that the
dispute should be settled by the Federal Contentious Administrative
Tribunal of Buenos Aires, as provided in the Concession agreement
between the parties.36 The tribunal held, however, that the BIT constituted
an open offer by the government and "consent" for the purposes of Article
27 Indeed, the CMS award, the first of the many Argentine cases, has required Argentina
to pay the company $1.33 billion. See UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes Settlement, supra
note 15, at 6; see also Luke Peterson, Argentina Moves to Annul Award in Dispute with CMS
Company over Financial Crisis, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable
Dev.), Oct. 26, 2005, § 4, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment-
investsdoct26_2005.pdf.
28 See Peterson, supra note 27.
29 See infra Part I.A. 1.
3O See infra Part I.A.2.
'1 See infra Part I.A.3.
32 See Cremades, supra note 20, at 81.
33 See Yanru Wei, On the Impropriety of China 's Recent Acceptance of Full ICSID
Jurisdiction, 13 J. INT'L ECON. LAW 108, at 139-40.
34 Id.
35 Lanco International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic (Case No. ARB/97/6), Preliminary
Decision on Jurisdiction of Dec. 8, 1998, 40 I.L.M. 457 (2001), at § 20, citing Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (Nov. 14, 1991), art. 7, §§ 2-3.
36 Lanco International, Inc., 40 I.L.M. 457, at § 6.
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25 (1) of the ICSID Convention.37  The tribunal made the later much-
debated distinction between the contract claim and the treaty claim, and
ruled that the Argentine government's consent to the BIT had not been
withdrawn by its subsequent execution of the Concession Agreement with
the investor concerned.
Subsequently in CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic,
39
the Argentine government again challenged ICSID's jurisdiction. This time
the government claimed, inter alia, that the license the Government granted
to a corporation, TNG, contained a separate dispute settlement mechanism
vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Court of Buenos Aires. The
Tribunal nevertheless upheld the investors' right to ICSID arbitration,
reasoning that CMS was not bound by the license as it was not a party to it.
But the Tribunal went further and ruled out altogether the legal effect of
such "Calvo clauses" by saying ". . . referring certain kinds of disputes to
the local courts... [is] not a bar to the assertion of jurisdiction by an ICSID
tribunal under the treaty, as the functions of these various instrument are
different.,
40
While a full discussion of this issue could merit a doctoral dissertation,
it is sufficient to note here that Argentina was unsuccessful in challenging
the jurisdiction of the ICSID tribunal. The government then attempted a
further procedural technique to tackle the problem: applying for annulment
of the ICSID award once the award is made. Thus in September 2005,
Argentina applied for annulment of the award on the merits of the CMS
case. 41 As of this article's submission, the annulment case is still pending
before the ICSID.
2. The Unconstitutionality Argument
The Argentine government has recently challenged the
constitutionality of BITs and, consequently, the BIT-based arbitration
process. 42 The Argentine prosecutor, for example, argued in a hearing in
7 Id. at §§ 32-33.
38 Id. at §§ 34-40. For further analyses on the distinction and relationship between
contractual claims and treaty claims, see Yuval Shany, Contract Claims vs. Treaty Claims:
Mapping Conflicts Between ICSID Decisions on Multisourced Investment Claim, 99 AM. J.
INT'L L. 835 (2005).
39 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Republic of Argentina, Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction, ICSID ARB/01/8, 42 I.L.M. 788 (2003).
40 Id. 76.
41 The annulment proceeding can at least provide some additional time for Argentina
before the payment has to be made. See Peterson, supra note 27.
42 There are two lines of argument for the unconstitutionality of the ICSID Convention
and its awards. One is the position actually adopted by the Argentine Government. The
other is a more recent and also more radical argument, which has not been adopted by the
Argentine Government. It holds that both BITs and the ICSID regime are unconstitutional
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the CMS Gas Transmission Co. vs. Republica Argentina case that:
a) Bilateral treaties do not supersede the National Constitution and
therefore a company can not invoke such treaty to avoid trying the
case in Argentina before local courts and violate the right of defense
in court of the Argentine State.
b) A company that is engaged in the rendering of public services can
not impose a limitation on the sovereign right of the government to
change its economic policy or the tariffs.
4 3
The Prosecutor also conducted a public campaign advocating the re-
adoption of the Calvo and Drago44 doctrines and attacking BITs and the
ICSID by stating that Argentina should never again a ree to submit a
contractual dispute to a system with ICSID characteristics. 5
The foundation of the constitutional argument is Sections 27 and 75 of
because they were approved in violation of the process established in the Argentine
Constitution as reformed in 1994.
Since the ICSID Convention was ratified and hence entered into force after the constitutional
reforms took effect, and the domestic implementation bill was also subsequently published,
the new constitutional provisions should apply. Additionally, the new Constitution requires
a special and very stringent procedure for "treaties of integration which delegate powers and
jurisdiction to supranational organizations." CONST. ARG. § 75.24. It is argued that since the
acceptance of the arbitral jurisdiction of the ICSID requires transfer of sovereign power of
domestic jurisdiction to be transferred to the ICSID, the ICSID Convention has "integration"
purposes and as such must be subjected to the special constitutional procedure. Because
such a procedure has never been undertaken, the validity requirement under the new system
has not been completed and consequently any arbitration carried out by the ICSID against
Argentina can be declared null and void by a domestic court.
The argument goes further that the special procedure required by the new Constitution is
mandatory, and as a result, such treaties delegating powers and jurisdiction to international
bodies as the ICSID Convention should be rendered null and void per se with the enactment
of the reform.
For further details of the arguments, See Carlos E. Alfaro & Pedro M. Lorenti, The Growing
Opposition of Argentina to ICSID Arbitral Tribunals: A Conflict between International and
Domestic Law? 6 J. WORLD INVEST. & TRADE 417, 425-29 (2005). Alfaro and Lorenti
consider that the ICSID Convention is merely a treaty of "cooperation", not an "integration
treaty", and therefore does not require the fulfilment of the special procedure required by the
new constitution. Id. at 429-30.
43 Carlos E. Alfaro, The Battle of the Century: Argentina Against the ICSID Arbitration
and the BITs, World Law Group E-news Issue No. 31 (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter Alfaro, Battle
of the Century], available at http://www.imakenews.comibcastro/e_66201-86528.pdf.
44 The Drago Doctrine was announced in 1902 by the Argentinean Minister of Foreign
Affairs Luis Maria Drago, arguing mainly that no foreign power, including the United States,
could use force to collect debt. See Amos S. Hershey, The Calvo and Drago Doctrines, I
Am. J. Int'l L. 26, 28-30 (1907).
45 Alfaro, Battle of the Century, supra note 43.
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the Constitution of Argentina. Section 75.22 sets forth the legal status of
international treaties as beneath the Constitution, but above the laws,
excepting certain human rights treaties, as expressly stipulated in the
Constitution, which enjoy constitutional status. In short, most treaties,
such as BITs and the ICSID Convention are subordinate to the Constitution.
Section 27 further subjects such treaties to "the principles of public law laid
down by this Constitution. 47 As a result, two commentator argue, "the
validity of the ICSID Convention in Argentina could be tested by
ascertaining its compatibility with said 'public law principles' of the
Constitution. 48  The commentators continue by saying that the same
public law principles' test could be applied to arbitration awards rendered
by the ICSID tribunals because they are the "products" of the ICSID.49
Therefore, the Congress should not have ratified treaties such as the ICSID
Convention that conflict with the Constitution's "public law principles" of
the Constitution, nor should the President have negotiated the treaty in the
46 Chapter IV, Section 75.22 of the Constitution of the Argentine Nation reads:
Treaties and concordats have a higher hierarchy than laws.
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; the American Convention on Human Rights; the
International Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Pact
on Civil and Political Rights and its empowering Protocol; the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide; the International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Woman; the Convention
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatments or
Punishments; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; in the full force of their
provisions, they have constitutional hierarchy, do no repeal any section of the First
Part of this Constitution and are to be understood as complementing the rights and
guarantees recognized herein. They shall only be denounced, in such event, by the
National Executive Power after the approval of two-thirds of all the members of
each House.
In order to attain constitutional hierarchy, the other treaties and conventions on
human rights shall require the vote of two-thirds of all the members of each House,
after their approval by Congress.
CONST. ARG. § 75.22.
47 Section 27 of the Argentine Constitution reads, "[t]he Federal Government is under the
obligation to strengthen its relationships of peace and trade with foreign powers, by means of
treaties in accordance with the principles of public law laid down by this Constitution." Id. §
27.
48 However, Alfaro and Lorenti seem to have entertained an expansive interpretation on
the concept of "public law principles in the constitution" by extending them to cover all
"matters of public law," with which the author of the present paper does not agree. See
Alfaro & Lorenti, supra note 42, at 420, 423-25.
49 id.
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first place.50 The power to review treaties for unconstitutionality, however,
lies in the hands of the Judiciary and, ultimately, the Federal Supreme Court
of Argentina. 51
In this connection, it is relevant to note that the Argentine judiciary
recently echoed the Administration's position in a landmark case that, in
matters of public policy, the Argentine courts may review the reasonability,
fairness and constitutionality (i.e., the merits) of an arbitration award.5 2 The
case, Jose Cartellone Construcciones Civiles S.A. v. Hidroelectrica
Norpatagonica S.A., reportedly concerned a domestic arbitration involving
a public services contract between a private Argentine company and a state-
owned enterprise. 53 The contract had an arbitration provision excluding any
appeal to courts.54 The Federal Supreme Court of Argentina decided that
the Court may "review arbitral awards if 'unconstitutional', 'unreasonable'
or 'illegal', even when the parties involved have specifically agreed to
waive the right to appeal. 55 This decision "reaffirmed the Supreme Court's
role of 'guardian' of the Constitution and of public policy, even in those
cases that ha[d] been previously submitted to arbitrators and where judicial
review ha[d] not been admitted by the parties.', 56  In supporting the
decision, the Supreme Court invoked Article 872 of the Civil Code, which
states that "rights granted with aim at public policy cannot be waived. 57
With this, the Court effectively rejected the possibility of any parties'
agreement restricting review over matters of public policy.
This decision implies that an award rendered by an international
arbitration tribunal may be challenged in Argentina as "unreasonable" or
"unconstitutional." This decision "is already influencing Argentine lower
courts in connection with international arbitrations. '58
From an international law point of view, the aforementioned
constitutionality argument is hardly tenable. The Vienna Convention on the
50 ld. at 421.
51 Id.
52 Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 1/6/2004, "Jose Cartellone Construcciones Civiles
S.A. v. Hidroelectrica Norpatagonica S.A.," La Ley [L.L.] (Causa J-87, XXXVII R.O.)
(Arg.), available at http://www.csjn.gov.ar/documentos/cfal3/toc-fallos.jsp.
53 Carlos E. Alfaro, Argentina: ICSID Arbitration and BITs Challenged by the Argentine





57 Id. (reporting on Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 1/6/2004, "Jose Cartellone
Construcciones Civiles S.A. v. Hidroelectrica Norpatagonica S.A., La Ley [L.L.] (Causa J-
87, XXXVII R.O.) (Arg.) available at http://www.csjn.gov.ar/documentos/cfal3/toc-
fallos.jsp (citing 11 COD. Civ. 872 (Arg.))).
58 Horacio A. Grigera Naon, Arbitration in Latin America: Progress and Setbacks, 21
ARB. INT'L 127, 165 (2005).
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Law of Treaties establishes that a state may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform according to treaty.59
Likewise, a state may not assert that its consent to be bound was expressed
in violation of a provision of the state's internal law requiring competence
to conclude treaties, unless violation of the provision was manifest and
concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.6 ° In the
case of Argentina, establishing that the consent given by the Argentine
Congress in BIT practice has been in "manifest" violation of a provision of
Argentine internal law would be very difficult. Even if the "violation"
could be established, it could hardly be shown that the violation was
"manifest," as a violation is only "manifest" if "objectively evident to any
state conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and
in good faith."6
Judicial review for ICSID awards is more straightforward, as the
ICSID Convention clearly requires member states to recognize ICSID
awards as binding and enforce them as if they were final judgment of a
court in that state. Nevertheless, the issue may arise for investment
arbitrations rendered by other arbitration tribunals such as International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") Court of Arbitration or ad hoc tribunals
established in accordance with the rules of the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"). Thus Argentine courts could
review the merits of such awards and set them aside on the ground that they
were "unreasonable" or "unconstitutional."
3. Legislative Measures
While using procedural tactics to suspend and delay the arbitration
process and the unconstitutionality argument to defend its position, the
Argentine government has also taken and is considering taking further
legislative measures to limit and prevent further investment arbitration
59 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
60 Id. art. 46. Some Argentine constitutional scholars have also noted such limitations
imposed by international law. For example, Nestor Sagues has pointed out that the
unconstitutionality of an international treaty could only be declared in the case where such a
treaty violates the competence rule as set forth in the Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. See Alfaro & Lorenti, supra note 42, at 422.
61 Vienna Convention, supra note 59, art. 26(2). The aforementioned Ceskoslovenska
Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. The Slovak Republic case also touched upon Article 46, but held it
irrelevant as it is about "invalidity of treaties," because the BIT at issue did not actually enter
into force. Case No. ARB/97/4 Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic
Decision of the Tribunal on the Objections to Jurisdiction of May 24, 1999, 14 ICSID
REv.-FOREIGN INv. L. J. 251, 265 (2000).
62 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, art. 54(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
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cases. To this end, the government has canceled a 1996 decree 63 and is
contemplating a new law to control international arbitration.
In 2003, the Argentine government passed a new decree terminating a
1996 Menen administration decision, which authorized the submission of
disputes between Argentine government and certain foreign investors to
international arbitration tribunals.64  The new decree pointed out that
referring such disputes to international arbitration "presented a series of
difficulties from the legal, political and economic point of view. '65
This was not the end of the story, but rather the first step of the
government's attempt to "renationali[z]e" state-investor disputes.66 Horacio
Rosatti, then head of the office of the Attorney General in the Treasury,
reportedly said that the aim of the government was to "recover the
jurisdiction of national courts. 67 Further, he said that the government was
considering measures to bring other state-investor disputes back within
Argentina's ambit, including measures to ensure that, first, companies had
"exhausted all legal channels in Argentina" and second, "the final decisions
of international tribunals should then undergo 'analysis' by the local
courts. 6 8
Following a speech by President Kirchner in March 2005, which
severely questioned eventual decisions of international or arbitration
tribunals on state-investor claims,69 two House Representatives of the ruling
party reportedly promoted a bill aimed at limiting the intervention of
national or international arbitral tribunals in cases involving the State, State
agencies or enterprises. 70 The proposed bill prohibits access to international
arbitration in such cases unless: a) an appeal of their decisions before
Argentine federal courts is provided, b) the State's counterparty in the
dispute is a foreign state (state-state disputes), or c) the Congress has
exempted the case through a specific statute.7' The bill also requests the
Executive to inform the appropriate authorities of Argentina's repeal of any
treaty accepting such jurisdiction and demands that the Executive, its
63 Decree No. 1021/96, Sept. 6, 1996, available at http://www.boletinoficial.gov.ar/
bora.portal/PrimeraSecciC3%B3n/BusquedaRapida/tabid/81/Default.aspx.
64 Decree No. 966/2003 of Oct. 28, 2003, available at
http://www.saij.jus.gov.ar/news/files/decreto966.html. See also Laurence Norman,
Government Reopens 7-Year-Old Case Vs Oil Group, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Oct. 28,
2003 (reporting the 2003 decree annulling the 1996 executive order) and Cremades, supra
note 20, at 81.
65 Decree No. 966/2003, supra note 64.
66 Norman, supra note 64.
67 Id.
68 id.
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agencies, and its enterprises issue necessary orders or decisions in order to
annul prior agreements or decisions contrary to such provisions.72 Since the
bill generally requires all state-investor arbitration cases to be subject to the
ultimate control of national courts, it would effectively abolish the finality
and hence, the autonomy of arbitration.
Other bills of similar nature have reportedly been introduced before the
Argentine Congress since 2004.73  For instance, a bill introduced in
September 2004 in the House of Deputies would "subject all disputes to
which the State is a party to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Argentine
courts and would prohibit any clause to the contrary., 74 The bill would also
require the denunciation of treaties in which the State had agreed to the
jurisdiction of judicial or arbitral tribunals.75 Another bill introduced in
August 2005 would demand "that matters related to ...economic policy
and determinations by Argentine courts concerning direct or indirect
expropriation should not be subject to review by international courts or
tribunals. 76 The August 2005 bill would also require that a provision "to
that effect be included in each investment treaty as a condition for
approval. 77 If such bills are adopted, the Calvo Doctrine can be said to
have finally returned to its birthplace. It remains to be seen, however,
whether the bills are mere rhetoric or will be ultimately adopted.
B. Brazil
Brazil, the Latin American giant, had long been resistant to arbitration
until 1996 when the Arbitration Act was adopted to recognise and facilitate
arbitration practice. In 2002, Brazil ratified the New York Convention and
paved the way for recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration
awards.78 Yet Brazil remains suspicious of international arbitration on
some level. This is witnessed first by a constitutionality challenge against
the Arbitration Act and more recently by the restrictive approach taken in
the 2004 Public-Private Partnership Law ("PPP Law").
72 Id.
73 See Oscar M. Garibaldi, Carlos Calvo Redivivus: The Rediscovery of the Calvo
Doctrine in the Era of Investment Treaties, TRANSNAT'L Dis. MGMT., Dec. 2006, at 43.
74 Id.
75 id.
76 Id. at 43-44.
71 Id. at 44.
78 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Status: 1958 -
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConvention-status.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
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1. The Constitutionality Challenge
In October 1996, soon after the Arbitration Act was approved, an
appeal, MB V v. Resil was brought before the Brazilian Federal Supreme
Court challenging the validity of the Arbitration Act as a violation of the
Constitution. As the first case concerning the Arbitration Act, the case
was brought to the attention of the eleven justices of the Court.80 The case
originated in a request of enforcement for a foreign arbitration award issued
in Barcelona, Spain.81 The Court, however, took the opportunity to review
the constitutionality of the entire Act.82
Initially, the reporting justice, Minister Seplveda Pertence, considered
that certain articles-including Articles 6 and 7, admitting specific
performance of the arbitration clause, Article 41, providing the exclusion of
courts when faced with an arbitration clause, and Article 42, listing the
circumstances under which an appeal might be made against a judgment
given under Article 7-of the Arbitration Act were unconstitutional, mainly
because they would represent a general denial of access to the judicial
review provided for in Article 5, XXXV of the 1998 Constitution. After
more than five years of discussion, however, the position of the reporting
judge was defeated in December 2001 by a seven to four decision, and the
Arbitration Act was declared constitutional.84
Although the final decision was pro-arbitration, the position of the
reporting judge and the other three dissenting judges, as well as the long
deliberation, has demonstrated Brazil's suspicion and hesitation towards
international arbitration.
2. The PPP Law
On December 30, 2004, Brazil adopted Federal Law No. 11079,
79 For details of the case, see Joao Bosco Lee, Brazil, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN
LATIN AMERICA 61, 63-66 (Nigel Blackaby et al. eds., 2002); see also Guido Santiago
Tawil, The Role of Arbitration and International, Regional, Subregional and Bilateral
Treaties in Latin America, http://www.bomchil.com/cas/articulos/The%20role%20of%
20arbitration%20and%20intemational.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
80 Tawil, supra note 79, at 14.
81 id.
82 In Brazil, the Supreme Court takes charge of the control of constitutionality, and has
jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of the entire law in case one of its provisions is
called into question. Therefore, even though the matter of the validity of the arbitration
clause was not argued in the enforcement procedure, the Court raised the issue on its own
initiative. See Lee, supra note 79, at 64 n. 15.
83 Article 5, XXXV of the Constitution provides that "the law shall not exclude from
review by the Judiciary any violation of or threat to a right." C.F. art. 5, XXXV (Braz.). For
further details of the reporting justice's reasoning, see Lee, supra note 79, at 63-64. See also
Tawil, supra note 79, at 14-15.
84 See Tawil, supra note 79, at 15.
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establishing a legal framework for Brazilian public-private partnerships
("PPPs") and for bids and concession agreements within the scope of
federal, state and local governments. 85 The PPP Law permits parties to
choose arbitration as a means to settle any dispute arising from PPP
contracts.86 It requires, however, that the seat of the arbitration be in Brazil
and the proceedings be conducted in Portuguese.87 Furthermore, the PPP
Law only accepts domestic arbitration and prohibits the submission of any
disputes in relation to a PPP contract to international arbitration. Foreign
investors therefore can only seek redress before local courts or arbitration
tribunals applying Brazilian law. This affirms the reluctance of the
Brazilian Government to subject cases involving public entities, such as
state-investor disputes, to international arbitration.
C. Venezuela
Certain events which occurred in Venezuela in recent years have also
been regarded as evidence of the resurgence of the Calvo Doctrine; 89 most
notably, the Exploration Round Case and the MINCA case.
1. The Exploration Round Case
"In December 1995 a petition was filed with the Venezuelan Supreme
Court asking for a ruling on the constitutionality of' arbitration provisions
"in the Congressional Accord approving the 1995 Exploration Bidding
Round." 90 One provision in the Congressional Accord, Condition 17, stated
that all disputes arising from Association Agreements (i.e., oil exploration
agreements with investors concluded following the bid) will be resolved by
binding arbitration. 91 A group of Venezuelan citizens, however, challenged
that this provision violated Article 127 of the Venezuelan Constitution,
85 Lei No. 11.079, de 30 de dezembro de 2004 (Braz.), available at
https://www.planalto.gov.br/ ccivil 03/ Ato2004-2006/2004/Lei/Ll1079.htm. An English
version is available at http://www.planejamento.gov.br/arquivos-down/ppp/legislacao/
lei 11079_301204_eng.pdf.
86 Id. art. 11, 1Il.
87 Id.
88 As noted by Rubins, the only path towards international arbitration recognized in
Brazil is by carefully drafted arbitration clauses in contracts between a foreign investor and
the Brazilian government, as "Brazil lacks the legal infrastructure that in many other
countries of Latin America give foreign investors explicit guarantees of equitable treatment
and access to international arbitration." See Noah D. Rubins, Investment Arbitration in
Brazil, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 1071, 1080-81, 1091 (2003).
89 See Cremades, supra note 20, at 81.
90 Elisabeth E. Elijuri, Oil Opening: A Constitutional Challenge, NAT'L L. CTR. FOR
INTER-AMERICAN FREE TRADE (1996), http://www.natlaw.com/pubs/spveen1 .htm.
9' See id.
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which, they believed, gave local courts exclusive jurisdiction over such
contracts. 9  Article 127 of the 1961 Venezuelan Constitution states as
follows:
[I]n contracts of public interest, even when not expressly stated,
there is considered to be incorporated, if not against the nature of the
contract, a clause pursuant to which any doubt or dispute that may
arise in connection with such contracts and which cannot be
amicably resolved by the parties, shall be decided by the competent
courts of the Republic, in accordance with its laws, and may not give
cause or reason to foreign claims.
93
Since the validity of arbitration had never been decided by the
Supreme Court and there had been contradictory opinions from the
Attorney General's office on this issue,94 the case was rather controversial.
On August 17, 1999, "the Venezuelan Supreme Court rendered a
milestone decision in the Exploration Round Case,, 95 upholding the
constitutionality of the arbitration clause in the Accord. The Supreme
Court held that although the agreements were "contracts of public interest,"
they fell within the exception in Article 127, which waived the application
of the local court jurisdiction requirement in case such application would be
"against the nature of the contract., 96 The Court held that this exception
"enabled the [g]overnment, subject to subsequent congressional approval,
to decide-on a case-by-case basis-whether to include an arbitration
clause in a contract of public interest. '97 The Court justified its conclusion
by stating that, in the present case, "an eventual arbitral tribunal would not
be confronted with issues concerning 'the national interest.'
98
Although the Exploration Round Case was resolved in favour of
arbitration and foreign investors, the uncertainty of the constitutionality of
arbitration has not been eradicated, given that the Venezuelan Supreme
Court did little to clarify the ambiguity surrounding the "nature of the
contract" exception. The new Constitution, adopted in 1999, after the case
was settled, did nothing to resolve the question. Contrary to what foreign
investors have hoped for, the new Constitution retained Article 127's
existing language along with its exception, but renumbered it as Article
92 See Cremades, supra note 20, at 81.
93 Id.
94 See Elijuri, supra note 90.
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151.L"
In March 2001 the President of Venezuela issued Instructive Order No.
4 "to regulate the internal review mechanisms of public interest contracts to
be executed by the Republic, particularly, in connection with the inclusion
of international arbitration clauses." 00 According to this Order, contracts
concerning public interests must be submitted to the Attorney General of
the Republic for an opinion with regard to the legality of the arbitration
clause in light of Article 151 of the new Constitution.10'
Additionally, as new members of a recently-established Supreme
Tribunal of Justice have been appointed, the Supreme Court's previous
favorable ruling upholding the constitutionality of an arbitration clause in a
public contract might also be changed. 10 2 This perception seems to have
been confirmed in the Minera las Cristinas, C.A. ("MINCA") v.
Corporaci6n Venezolana de Guyana ("CVG") case ("MINCA case"), 10 3 a
discussion of which follows.
2. The MINCA Case
The MINCA case involved a 1992 mining agreement between CVG, an
agency of the Venezuelan Government, and MINCA, a Venezuelan
company ninety-five percent owned by a Canadian company, Vannessa
Ventures Ltd. The agreement was for the exploration, development and
exploitation of gold and copper in an area called "Las Cristinas."'10 4 The
agreement contained a dispute resolution provision requiring "that any
dispute between parties would be referred to an arbitration seating in
Venezuela, in accordance with the ICC Arbitration Rules and the
Venezuelan Code of Civil Procedure."' 1 5  A dispute arising in 2001
between the two parties resulted in the CVG terminating the mining
agreement and then taking physical control of the site. 0 6 Later the Ministry
of Energy and Mines passed a resolution to terminate the mining agreement
and the government "issued a Presidential Decree declaring the area of Las
99 CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA art. 151. An unofficial
English translation of the Constitution can be found at the Australia Venezuela Solidarity
Network website, available at http://www.venezuelasolidarity.org/?q=node/53 (last visited
on Mar. 27, 2007).
100 Bernardo Weininger & David M. Lindsey, Venezuela, in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 223, 235 (Nigel Blackaby et al. eds., 2002).
'o' Id. at 235-36.
102 See Cremades, supra note 20, at 83.
103 Bemardo M. Cremades, Resurgence of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin America, 7 BUs.
LAW INT'L 53, 65 (2006) [hereinafter Cremades, Calvo Doctrine] (citing Decision No. 0083
of the Political Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court, July 15, 2004).
04 id.
'o' Id. at 66.
106 Id.
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Cristinas reserved to the National Government."'
0 7
MINCA first challenged CVG's action, and then the ministerial
resolution and the Presidential Decree before domestic courts, but all of its
requests for judicial review were dismissed. 0 8 In May 2002, MINCA filed
a petition in front of the Supreme Court of Justice, "requesting the
enforcement of the arbitration clause."' 0 9 The Supreme Court dismissed
MINCA's petition on the ground that the subject matter concerned state
assets and therefore could not be subject to arbitration."1 0 The Court based
its decisions on, inter alia, the aforementioned Article 151 of the
Constitution, which generally subjects contracts of public interests to the
exclusive jurisdiction of local courts."' It thus resurrected the uncertainty
of Venezuela's position towards international arbitration.
The aforementioned events in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela,
together with similar events in other Latin American states," 2 such as
Ecuador's cancellation of oil contacts with Occidental Petroleum" 3 and
Bolivia's nationalization of its hydrocarbons sector," 4 clearly suggest that
the tide of investment policy seems to be turning. No longer are Latin
American states as eager to embrace neo-liberalism. Rather, a more
conservative or nationalistic approach seems to be gaining the upper hand
in these states.'1 5 As a result, Calvo does not seem to be dead, as many
107 id.
108 Id.
109 Cremades, Calvo Doctrine, supra note 103, at 66.
110 Id.
"' Id. at 67.
112 Apart from the said three states, other Latin American states have also expressed
increasing dissatisfaction in international arbitration. For example, the Attorney General of
Ecuador has reportedly said that he is studying whether Ecuador should terminate the BIT
with the United States. Di Rosa, supra note 23, at 74 n. 88.
113 Luke E. Peterson, Ecuador Moves Against Occidental Petroleum Contract and Assets,
INv. TREATY NEWS, May 16, 2006, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/
itn_may 16 2006.pdf.
114 In May 2006, Bolivia issued a decree through which natural hydrocarbon resources
were nationalized. The decree stipulates that companies conducting activities in the gas and
petroleum production industry have to turn over the entire production of hydrocarbons to
"Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos" (YPFB), "which will control the distribution
of these resources, and will also determine the amount and conditions at which gas and
petroleum will be allocated to the domestic and foreign markets." Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law,
Bolivia: Presidential Supreme Decree 28701 (Nationalization of Hydrocarbons Sector) (May
1, 2006), International Law In Brief, (May 25, 2006), http://www.asil.org/ilib/2006/05/
ilib060525.htm#l1.
115 The "revival" or "resurgence" of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin America has attracted
wide attention. For instance, in September 2005, the Washington D.C. Bar organized a
timely seminar entitled "The Resurgence of the Calvo Doctrine?" District of Columbia Bar,
"The Resurgence of the Calvo Doctrine?" seminar program, http://www.bg-
consulting.com/docs/calvo-program.jpg (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
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assumed or predicted, but rather alive and well.
II. THE REVIVAL OF THE CALVO DOCTRINE: BEYOND LATIN
AMERICA
The resurgence of the Calvo Doctrine identified above is not confined
to Latin America. Indeed, Latin American states' recent Calvo move
coincided with a worldwide trend reflecting, revising and rejecting neo-
liberalist investment instruments, while embracing a more conservative and
balanced regime for international investment. Thus, to everyone's surprise,
the Calvo Doctrine "suddenly is in vogue again.., in the U.S.
Congress!"' 16  Mounting cases against the U.S. government before
international arbitration tribunals, particularly North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA") tribunals, has put the United States, a long-time
unreserved advocate of investment liberalism, on defense, and forced it to
re-examine investment treaties and treaty-based arbitration for the first time
in history from a defendant's position. It has been noted that, since the
mid-1990s, there has been "a gradual, relatively moderate (but
unmistakable) weakening" in the United States of the commitment to the
traditional high standard of investment protection.' 7  Thus in 1994 the
Clinton administration dropped in its model BIT the "Umbrella Clause", a
provision requiring the state to observe obligations it had assumed in
relation to the foreign investment.' 18 In 2001, the three NAFTA member
states, led by the United States, adopted a binding interpretation declaring
that "[t]he concept of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and
security' do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is
required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment
of aliens," 19 in an effort to eliminate the undesired influence of the Pope &
Talbot Inc. v. Canada120 jurisprudence. A bill was enacted in 2002
regarding the Executive's authority to negotiate trade and investment
116 David Schneiderman, Calvo in Congress: The Migration of Constitution-Like
Investment Rules, http://www.ualberta.ca/GLOBALISM/pdf/Aus%20pdfs/
schneidermanab.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
117 Garibaldi noted that such change might be the result of a political compromise
between the country's traditional position and the pressure from the circumstantial alliance
of at least three political forces, namely the pro-regulation interests on the left and the legal




120 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, 13 WORLD TRADE & ARB. MAT'L 61 (2001), available
at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/Award Merits-e.pdf. The Award held
that fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security standards imposed an
additional obligation to the international minimum standard of treatment under general
international law. See Id. at I11.
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treaties, which requires that,
[T]he principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding
foreign investment are to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-
distorting barriers to foreign investment, while ensuring that foreign
investors in the United States are not accorded greater substantive
rights with respect to investment protections than United States
investors in the United States, and to secure for investors important
rights comparable to those that would be available under United
States legal principles and practice.12
1
This bill was regarded as "Calvo in the Congress" because it adopted
language very similar to the Calvo Doctrine as policy in international
investment treaty-making practice. As a result, the U.S. government
recently revised its Model BIT 122 and adopted a more conservative
approach in its BIT practice. A narrower definition of "investment," for
example, was adopted in the U.S.-Uruguay BIT signed in December 2004,
the very first after the 2004 Model BIT was adopted. 23 Indirect
expropriation has been clarified and redefined so that mere adverse effect
on the economic value of an investment does not constitute an indirect
expropriation and that, except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory
regulatory actions by a party aimed at protecting legitimate public welfare
objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not
constitute indirect expropriations. A special procedure was devised in the
U.S.-Uruguay BIT at the early stages of the dispute settlement process, with
a view to discarding "frivolous" claims.124 Moreover, the BIT envisions the
possibility of setting up a mechanism for appellate review, in order to
ensure greater consistency in arbitral awards. 121
121 Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2102 (b)(3), 116 Stat. 995 (emphasis
added).
122 U.S. State Department, Treaty Between the Gov't of the United States of Am. and the
Gov't of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Prot. of Inv. (2004 Model
BIT), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeSectors/Investment/ModelBIT/asset-upload_
file847_.6897.pdf.
123 Instead of the previously used open asset-based definition of investment, the U.S.-
Uruguay BIT has opted to define the term "investment" in economic terms, which in
principle covers every asset that an investor owns and controls, but adds the qualification
that such assets must have the "characteristics of an investment," such as "the commitment
of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk."
Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Oct. 25,
2004, U.S.-Uru., § A, art. 1, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/WorldRegions/
Americas/South_America UruguayBIT/asset_upload-file582_6728.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-
Uruguay BIT]. This is complemented by exclusions of several kinds of assets (e.g. certain
debt instruments). Id.
124 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements, supra note 8, at 5.
125 Id.
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Second, many other states, like Canada, Japan, and certain Latin
American states, are following the steps of the United States. Thus, James
Mcllroy has observed that Canada's new model BIT is noteworthy
"because it steps back from a current high water mark of private investor
protection.' 26 Further, an UNCTAD study has discovered that a "new
generation of BITs" has actually emerged, modelled after the new U.S. and
Canadian model BITs.127 These new BITs exhibit four main features, most
of which have the effect of either narrowing down substantive obligations,
or tightening-up access to the state-investor dispute settlement
mechanism.'28
Third, world-wide efforts have failed time and again to create a global
mechanism that protects and liberalizes investment flows. The debacle of
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI") 2 9 within the OECD
demonstrated that a liberal approach toward international investment was
not viable even among developed countries, namely the OECD member
states. 30 The Cancun ministerial conference, which led to the abandonment
of the talks on a MAI within the WTO framework,' 3' in turn, clearly refused
another major effort to set forth a liberal investment regime on a global
scale.
Finally, the change of governmental attitude towards investment
liberalization is also reflected in domestic legal changes and BIT growth
trends. As Table 1 shows, restrictive measures have been on the surge since
2000. In 2000, only two percent of the legal changes were geared toward
more restrictions-this increased to seven percent in 2001. In 2003 it
reached ten percent, followed in 2004 by an additional three point increase.
The only drop during this period occurred in 2002, from seven to five
percent, and did not change the general conservative trend. While there are
still new BITs concluded each year, the general trend of newly-signed BITs
has declined since 2001, as shown in Chart 1.
126 James Mcllroy, Canada's New Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion
Agreement: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back?, 5 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 621,
646 (2004).
127 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements, supra note 8, at 4.
128 Id. at 4-6.
129 Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. (OECD), Multilateral Agreement on
Investment: Documentation From the Negotiations, http://wwwl.oecd.org/ daf/mai/ (last
visited Mar. 27, 2007).
130 Id.
13' Decision Adopted by the General Council, Doha Work Programme, § (1)(g),
WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda-e/ddadraft_
3 ljulO4_e.pdf.
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Table 1: Restrictive Measure Adopted 2000-2004
Number of legal Number of more Percentage ofYear restrictive restrictive measures
measures adopted in total changes
2000 150 3 (2%)
2001 208 14 (7%)
2002 248 12 (5%)
2003 244 24 (10%)
2004 271 36 (13%)
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The international investment regime tide has been turning even beyond
Latin America: neo-liberalism is no longer unreservedly favored by all
countries, developed and developing states alike. 133 On the contrary, now
132 UNCTAD, http://www.unctad.org/iia.
133 The 1990s may be regarded as an era of 'neo-liberalism'. In that period, investment
and trade liberalization had gain almost universal support in all states, developed or
developing. The best manifestation of this was that even the staunchest advocates and
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even developed states, including the strongest advocates of a liberal
investment regime, such as the United States, have started to rethink the
roles and functions of international investment treaties and to redesign their
BIT programs in order to contain the threats posed by the previously
unfettered liberal investment regimes.' 34 Calvo is regaining ground in the
battle of international investment law.
III. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A
THIRD WAY BETWEEN NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE CALVO
DOCTRINE?
The resurgence of the Calvo Doctrine demonstrates that the neo-
liberalist ideology underpinning international investment instruments
exemplified by existing BITs1 35 is neither ideal nor sustainable. However, it
is unclear whether the current trend is going to eventually lead to, and
sustain, a complete restoration of the Calvo Doctrine in its original form, or
whether it is only a transitory phenomenon, which will soon die off. In
other words, it is uncertain whether the political economy of international
investment law will be completely replaced by the Calvo Doctrine (as an
example of "economic nationalism"), or will continue to be dominated by
neo-liberalism (or "economic liberalism").136
supporters of Calvo Doctrine in Latin America had changed their attitude toward foreign
investment and had started to enter into BITs that embrace investment liberalism. For details
of these changes, see Shan, supra note 3, §§ II-VI.
134 The aforementioned 'Calvo in Congress' episode is the best example of such change
of attitude in developed states.
135 BITs present themselves as liberalist instruments, as evidenced by the goals typically
referred to in their preambles, i.e., to create favorable conditions for investment and to
increase economic prosperity. The history of the birth and development of BITs also shows
that, as observed by Kenneth Vandevelde, "a principal inducement for states to enter into a
BIT has been precisely that it affirms liberalism." Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political
Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 621, 627 (1998). This nature
of BITs, as embodied in their preambles, has actually been acknowledged by arbitration
tribunals and has had an impact in the interpretation of BIT provisions. Id. at 627-28.
136 According to Vandevelde, who pioneered studies in the political economy of BITs,
there are three dominant political economic theories relevant to BITs: economic nationalism,
economic liberalism and Marxist economics. Among them, Marxist economics is generally
hostile to foreign investment, considering it a tool of neo-colonialism that subjects local
economies to foreign control and promotes underdevelopment. Following the collapse of the
Soviet Bloc and the reforms in China and other formerly Communist states, this theory is no
longer practised. "Economic nationalism" holds that international investment should be
regulated to ensure that it promotes national political policy. Economic nationalist
developing states therefore have sought to control inward and outward investment flows
through interventionist measures-such as protective tariffs, tax incentives, investment
screening, and performance requirements. The goals are to attract those foreign investments
that would further their development policy, to prevent establishment of those investments
that would not, and to ensure that investment, once established, would continue to operate in
accord with national policy. Calvo Doctrine is a typical reflection of this theory, particularly
654
Revival of Calvo Doctrine
27:631 (2007)
The current trend is likely to continue, but unlikely to restore Calvo in
its original form. Rather, Calvo will be revived in a modified form, striking
a balance between the rights and interests of the investors and those of the
states. There are two reasons for the sustainability of this trend. First, as
elaborated above, the resurgence of Calvo is not a single event happening in
one country or one region. Rather, it has been echoed throughout the
world. Such a global trend is unlikely to quickly disappear. Second, and
more fundamentally, the decline and resurgence of Calvo has exposed a
fundamental flaw in both the previous classical Calvo regime and the
current dominant neo-liberal regime: the imbalance of the rights and
obligations between the host state and foreign investors.
Before the 1980s, when Calvo dominated Latin America and indeed
international forums such as the United Nations General Assembly, states
had every power and no substantial international law restraints,' while
investors took great commercial and non-commercial risks without
sufficient international legal protection. There was an imbalance in favor of
the states. Since the 1980s, and particularly in the 1990s when states-
including Latin American states-embraced the neo-liberalistic investment
regime, foreign investors have enjoyed every "constitution-like" guarantee
and privilege derived from BITs and other investment instruments, 38 while
governments were forced to retreat-there was too much of an imbalance
favoring foreign investors. Neither regime is ideal, although both of them
may have some merit.
Calvo is unlikely to be completely restored because no country can
now afford to be entirely cut off from interactions with the world in this era
of globalization. With intensified international interactions, there come
in developing states. Economic liberalism posits that free markets, unfettered by state
regulation, would result in the greatest prosperity for all. Accordingly, liberalism also
advocates the free movement of capital across borders, which in essence holds that the state
should permit the market to determine the direction of international investment flows. This
theory is generally favored by developed capital exporting states, which have actively
promoted BIT programs, particularly since the 1970s, as an essential neo-liberalist tool. For
a good analysis of the basic features of these theories, and BITs as quintessentially liberalist
instruments, see id. at 621-28.
137 For details of the origin of Calvo Doctrine and its international influence before the
1980s, see Shan, supra note 3, § I.
138 Some scholars have argued that BITs and other investment treaties display the
characteristics of domestic constitutions in that they bind governments over long periods of
time to constitution-like rules designed to protect the private property of individuals and
firms against discriminatory treatment or takings of investment interests, and that they
generate constitution-like entitlements legally enforceable before tribunals and courts. See
David Schneiderman, NAFTA's Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to
Canada, 46 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 499 (1996). See also Stephen Clarkson, Somewhat Less
Than Meets the Eye: NAFTA as Constitution, Address at the International Sociological
Association Annual Meeting (Jul. 27, 1998), http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/-clarkson/
manuscripts/ecconstitution98.html.
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more extensive international rules, setting forth international substantive
standards and procedural remedies. To reject such standards and remedies
altogether, as Calvo originally advocated, would be neither plausible nor
desirable. The classical Calvo Doctrine no longer fits the world as it is
now, if it ever fit the world before. On the other hand, the neo-liberal
regime must be reformed to avoid repeating the "Catch-22" situations that
Argentina and many other Latin American states have faced in recent
years. 39  An ideal FDI regime, therefore, might have to be found
somewhere between the two previously existing regimes, perhaps a "Third
Way" in international investment law.
The new generation of BITs, exemplified by the new U.S. and
Canadian model BITs, may be regarded as a step in that direction. 40 They
nevertheless demonstrate only small changes within the previous liberalist
paradigm of BITs. These changes do not alter the fundamental character of
these investment treaties as quintessential liberalist instruments, which only
protect and "empower" investors without sufficient consideration of the
rights of host states and the duties of the investors.
To fully address the problem of the imbalance of rights and obligations
between investors and states, a more radical, and even revolutionary
solution is needed. There are two alternative possibilities: one is to
complement the current liberalist or capitalist BITs with binding
instruments, in the form of bilateral, or preferably global, agreements on the
rights of states and the obligations of foreign investors (a "complementary
approach"). Efforts of this nature have been made at global and multilateral
levels, but with only very limited success.' 41 Hence, within the OECD, the
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises have been adopted to regulate the
conduct of multinational corporations, but lack binding force. 42 Globally,
the U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations had been drafted
and discussed intensively in the 1970s and 1980s, but was finally
abandoned in the 1990s during the heatwave of global investment
139 In the annulment application, for example, Argentina argued that the judgment by the
ICSID in the CMS case placed the country in a "Catch-22" when facing an emergency
economic situation: a state may either do nothing and let the economy collapse, or do
something to rescue the economy but then go bankrupt paying huge compensation to
investors affected by such rescuing efforts. See Peterson, supra note 27, § 4.
140 For instance, James Mcllroy has noted that the new Canadian model BIT attempts to
"strike a balance between private investors' rights and the right of a sovereign State to
regulate in public interest." Mcllroy, supra note 126, at 644.
141 See WENIUA SHAN, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF EU-CHINA INVESTMENT RELATIONS
274 (2005).
142 See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,2340,en-2649_34889_
2397532_1_1_1_l,00.html, (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
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liberalization.143 It may be easier to simply resume work on the U.N. Code
of Conduct with a view to establishing a binding global treaty on the
regulation of the duties and responsibilities of international investors.
The other possibility, which might be called a "consolidated
approach," is to add provisions on the responsibilities of foreign investors
to the existing bilateral or multilateral investment instruments. This would
effectively redefine the nature and ideology of BITs, moving from a one-
sided liberalist instrument assuring and empowering foreign investors,
toward a more rational instrument that balances the interests, rights and
responsibilities of all parties concerned, particularly between host state and
foreign investors. In this regard, one has to refer to the impressive work
done by the International Institute for Sustainable Development ("IISD"),
which developed the IISD Model International Agreement on Investment
for Sustainable Development ("IISD Model Investment Agreement").1 44
The IISD Model Investment Agreement marks the first major attempt to
construct such a consolidated instrument on international investment. It
aims to address the balance of interests among foreign investors, the host
states and the home state. In a separate article entitled "Objective," it sets
out its objectives "[promoting] foreign investment that supports sustainable
development, in particular in developing and least developed countries.' 45
The goal of promoting investment is no longer a singular objective, but one
that is complemented and qualified by the goal of sustainable development.
Also, the Preamble clearly states that it seeks "an overall balance of rights
and obligations in international investment between investors, host
countries and home countries."'146 To strike such a balance, the text of the
IISD Model Investment Agreement provides for sets of substantive rights
and obligation for each of the actors, as shown in Table 2 below. The
Agreement also sets out three mechanisms to implement such rights and
obligations. It encourages states to incorporate the rights and obligations in
the Agreement into domestic laws, which eventually enables domestic
remedies to be brought to bear on investors. 147 It allows host states to raise
the issues of compliance with the obligations in front of the international
dispute settlement mechanism devised therein, either by a direct claim by a
143 The last draft version was completed in 1988, but work on it was suspended in early
1990. For further details of the draft code, see M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT (2004).
144 International Institute for Sustainable Development, IISD Model International
Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development, [hereinafter IISD Model Agreement]
20 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 91 (2005).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Howard Mann, The IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for
Sustainable Development: An Introductory Note, 20 ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J.
84, 86 (2005).
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host state to annul rights of an investor under this Agreement due to
persistent failure to comply with the obligations, or a counterclaim to an
investor-state claim based on the breach of an obligation by an investor.
148
Finally, it models the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises and
provides for a national authority to thoroughly investigate civil society
complaints of non-compliance in the host or home state. 149
The IISD Model Investment Agreement notably contains some
interesting innovations. For example, allowing a direct claim by host states
against foreign investors for failing to comply with their investor
obligations is a novel approach.150 Although it is yet unknown whether and
how it might work in practice, it is indeed a "logical corollary" of the one-
sided investor-state dispute settlement regime that exists for current
international investment instruments. 151 Despite that it is still in the early
stages of development and that there is certainly room for further
improvement, 152 the IISD Model Agreement represents the first genuine
effort to strike a balance between the rights and obligations of host states
and foreign investors and therefore deserves serious consideration.




Foreign - National treatment - Comply with local laws
Investors - Most favored nation - Pre-establishment impact
- Minimum international assessment
standards - Anti corruption
- No expropriation - Environmental
without compensation management/international
- Senior management environmental obligations
- Transfer of assets - Human rights protection
- Core labor standards
- Provision and publication of
information
- Investor civil liability
148 Id. at 86.
141 Id. at 87.
150 IISD Model Agreement, supra note 144, art. 18(C).
151 Mann, supra note 147, at 86.
152 For example, Articles 1 I(A) and (B) might be improved by referring to the overriding
effect of binding international law, particularly international treaty obligations, when
asserting the applicability of local laws and local jurisdiction of the host state. See IISD
MODEL AGREEMENT, supra note 144, art. 11 (A)-(B).
153 Mann, supra note 147, at 88.
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Host States Inherent right of states Procedural fairness
to regulate, articulate - Maintenance of
development policy environmental standards,
- Right to performance labor standards
requirements - Minimum standards for:
(exception from environmental assessment,
national treatment) core labor, human rights
- Investment promotion - Anti-corruption
- Access to investor - Publication of information
information
Home States - Claim protection of - Assistance to facilitate
investor rights in foreign investment
dispute settlement - Provide information on
investors
- Ensure procedural laws allow
for hearing on investor
liability
- Anti-corruption
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: FROM A "NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE"
TO A "PRIVATE-PUBLIC DEBATE"
The revival of Calvo in and beyond Latin America not only signals a
significant change of attitude and ideology toward the international
investment regime, but also marks a noticeable shift of tension in
international investment law, indicating progress. In previous debates on
international investment instruments, such as U.N. General Assembly
Resolutions 154 and BITs, the tension was primarily between developed
states, with capital-exporting countries representing the interests of foreign
investors, and developing states, and with capital-importing countries
representing the interests of host states. 155 In other words, the previous
154 Resolutions 1803 and 3281 are the most important resolutions relating to the standard
of treatment for international investment, particularly on the issue of expropriation and its
compensation. The two instruments are traditionally read as taking contrasting stands and
having different legal effects. The author is, however, of the view that the two resolutions
should be read together as one emerging standard of two different development stages,
carrying the same legal implications. See SHAN, supra note 141, at 181-87. See also
Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/1803 (Dec. 14, 1962); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A.
Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. AIRES/29/3281 (Jan. 15, 1975).
155 The literature on this debate has been tremendous. See, e.g., S. FRIEDMAN,
EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Greenwood Press, 1983) (1953); Charles N.
Brower, Current Developments in the Law of Expropriation and Compensation:
Preliminary Survey of A wards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 21 INT'L LAW. 639
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international investment law-making process has been dominated and
characterized by a North-South divide, with developed states trying to push
for a neo-liberalist agenda, and developing states attempting to resist such
an agenda and maintain their inherent rights to regulate and control foreign
investment. The picture has recently changed and become much more
complicated. The North-South divide has narrowed from what it was three
or four decades ago. Currently, a more dominant issue seems to be the
conflict between the private interests of foreign investors and the public
interests of states, namely host states. In other words, the featured debate of
international investment law-making seems to have shifted from a "North-
South Divide" to a "Private-Public Debate." The following four major
factors might have contributed to this shift.
The first factor is the shift, or the realization, of the role of leading
developed states with regard to international investment. Before the 1990s,
developed states such as the United States and Canada viewed themselves,
and rightly so, as capital-exporting states and representatives of foreign
investors, and therefore fought hard to secure the highest possible standard
of protection for their investors abroad by pushing ahead BIT and
multilateral investment treaty programmes. Since the 1990s, particularly
after a series of NAFTA Chapter 11 cases, these countries have woken up
realising that they are also major capital-importing states and therefore also
have every reason to defend their interest as host states, just like what the
developing states had done in the 1960s and 19 70s. According to Todd
Weiler, so far there have been sixteen NAFTA cases against the United
States and thirteen against Canada. 156 Such litigation has forced the two
governments into the shoes of capital-importing states, a standing point that
used to be exclusive to developing states. Consequently, as mentioned
above, they have stepped back from their previously unfettered liberal
approach and have started to revise their BIT programs. Such a change by
leading developed states helps to establish a shared understanding and a
common interest between them and developing states: the need to
effectively tame and regulate foreign investors and their investment in the
(1987); Rudolf Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property, 75
AM. J. INT'L L. 553 (1981); Francesco Francioni, Compensation for Nationalisation of
Foreign Property: The Borderland Between Law and Equity, 24 INT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 255
(1975); Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in
International Law, 176 RECUEIL DES CouRs 263 (1982); Eduardo Jimfnez de Arfchaga, State
Responsibility for the Nationalisation of Foreign Owned Property, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 179 (1978); Davis R. Robinson, Notes and Comments, Expropriation in the
Restatement (Revised), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 176 (1984); Oscar Schachter, Compensation for
Expropriation, id. at 121; M. Sornarajah, State Responsibility and Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 79 (1986); F. A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion
and Protection of Investments, 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 241 (1981).
156 See Todd Weiler, Naftaclaims.com, http ://www.naflaclaims.com/disputes-
canada.htm; id., http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes-us.htm (last visited Jul. 31, 2006).
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international investment law-making process.
The second factor is that the role of developing countries in the
international investment process has also been undergoing change. A
number of developing countries have become more and more important
foreign investment suppliers in the world. In its World Investment Report
2004, UNCTAD highlighted that "outward FDI from developing countries
is becoming important.' ' 57  The report noted that some developing
economies such as Malaysia, South Korea, and Singapore had already
developed an established track record in outward investment. 158 Others,
such as Chile, Mexico and South Africa, have become players relatively
recently.159 Others, such as Brazil, China and India, are at the take-off
stage. 6 Viewed in relation to gross fixed capital formation, a number of
developing economies, such as Singapore, Hong Kong (China), and Taiwan
rank higher than a number of developed countries (Germany, Japan, and the
United States) in FDI outflow. In other words, a number of developing
countries, relatively speaking, are already among top investors.'
Moreover, annual FDI outflows from developing countries have grown
faster over the past fifteen years than those from developed countries-from
negligible up until the end of the 1980s, to over one-tenth of the world total
stock and some six percent of world total flows in 2003 ($0.9 trillion and
$36 billion, respectively). 62  Some developing economies are now large
investors by global standards.
163
The changing role of developing states is also witnessed by a notable
increase of South-South BITs in recent years. The 2005 World Investment
Report, for example, noted that the largest number of the new BITs signed
during 2004 were between developing states. 164 The change in the role of
157 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004: The Shift Towards Services, at 19, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/WlR/2005, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.33 (2004) [hereinafter UNCTAD,






163 In 2003, for instance, Hong Kong (China) had a larger outward FDI stock than
Sweden, even if round tripping and indirect FDI is taken into account. Also, transnational
corporations (TNCs) from Hong Kong figure prominently among the leading TNCs from the
developing world, along with those from Singapore, Mexico and South Africa. UNCTAD,
2004 Report, supra note 157.
164 The Report noted that there were twenty-eight BITs signed between developing states
accounting for thirty-eight percent of the total, followed closely by the twenty-seven BITs
between developed and developing states. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005:
Transnational Corporations and Internationalization of R&D, at 24, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2005, U.N. Sales No. E.05.II.D.10 (2005) [hereinafter UNCTAD, 2005
Report], available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2005-en.pdf.
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developing states thus echos similar changes in the role of the developed
states identified above, and further enhances the shared understanding and
interest in international investment law-making between the two groups.
Chart 2: FDI outflows from developing countries by regionl980-20031
65
($ Billions)
Deoh countries / /
Latin Ameca and
theCaribbean Ma anthe WK&
Aftica
0 -
- . . .,. - / - 1 N
The third factor is that the domestic legal infrastructure in developing
states for the protection and promotion of foreign investment has been
significantly improved, as a result of the extensive legal changes that
favoured foreign investment and the massive BIT networks established,
particularly during the 1990s. According to the 2005 World Investment
Report, an average of sixty-four states a year have made some changes to
their FDI laws and regulations since 1991. Among the 2156 changes made
during that period, 2006 were changes aimed toward a more liberal
investment regime, accounting for ninety-three percent of the total changes
(see Table 3).66 Meanwhile, there has been an explosive expansion of the
BIT network in the world. UNCTAD statistics show that by the end of
2004, the number of BITs world wide had reached 2392, among which
165 UNCTAD, FDI!TNC Database, www.unctad.org/fdistatistics (last visited Mar. 27,
2007).
166 Id. at 28.
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2010 were concluded in the 1990s (see Chart 1).167 Moreover, states
actively entered into bilateral, regional and trans-regional preferential trade
and investment agreements ("PTIAs"). By April 2005, 212 such
agreements had also been concluded, among which approximately eighty-
seven percent were signed in the 1990s. 1 68 Such changes in domestic law,
together with the extensive international investment treaty network, have
significantly narrowed the gap between developed and developing countries
in terms of the legal protection and promotion of international investment.
Although the gap admittedly still exists, it is by far less significant than it
was three decades ago. Consequently, the need for further legal protection
of foreign investment has been greatly reduced, as has the tension between
developed and developing states in international investment law making
process. This obviously paved the way for a shift of attention to a more
universal question, namely the conflict between public and private interests.
Table 3: Changes in Domestic Legislations (1999-2004)169
Number of Number of Changes in Changes
countries changes favour of detrimentalchanged FDI made to FDI foreign to foreign
laws laws investors investors
1991 35 82 80 2
1992 43 79 79 0
1993 57 102 101 1
1994 49 110 108 2
1995 64 112 106 6
1996 65 114 98 16
1997 76 151 135 16
1998 60 145 136 9
1999 63 140 131 9
2000 69 150 147 3
2001 71 208 194 14
2002 70 248 236 12
2003 82 244 220 24
2004 102 271 235 36
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 UNCTAD, 2005 Report, supra note 164, at 26.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:631 (2007)
The fourth and final factor is that the increased participation of civil
society in the international investment law-making process has highlighted
the need for and importance of regulating international investment. Earlier
NAFTA cases on investment arbitration, particularly the controversial
Metalclad Case, 70 focused the attention of many non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs") on international investment treaties and related
arbitration practice. The debate on the Draft Multilateral Agreement on
Investment within the OECD and the discussions about a multilateral
agreement on investment within the WTO framework in the Doha Round
have demonstrated the width and depth of NGO participation in the global
investment law-making processes. While individual NGOs have different
missions and therefore different foci, they all share a main concern: that
investment liberalization cannot be achieved at the expense of important
public interests, such as human rights, environmental, and labor standards.
In other words, they have helped highlight the importance of regulating
foreign investment for the public good. Such voices from NGOs, most of
which are actually based in developed states, have over the years become
more and more influential in domestic and international law and policy
making. As a result, they have raised the awareness of the general public,
particularly in the developed world, of the need to regulate foreign
investment, and thus contributed to the shift of tension in international
investment law making.
To conclude, recent years have witnessed a shift of tension on
international investment law-making, from "strong states" versus "weak
states" (i.e., a "North-South divide"), towards "state sovereignty" versus
"corporate sovereignty"' 171 (i.e., a "Private-Public debate)." If this is what is
happening, there should be a better chance to strike a sensible global deal
on the protection, supervision, promotion, and regulation of international
investment for the general good of the world.
170 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), ICSID Case No.ARB
(AF)/97/1, ICSID REv.-FOR. INVESTMENT L.J. 168 (2001).
171 Given the size and strength of some transnational corporations, and that they are now
often equipped with the standing to directly bring lawsuit against host governments before
international forums such as the ICSID under BITs and other investment instruments, it is
not too much of an exaggeration to say that they enjoy certain elements of "sovereignty",
which may be referred to as "corporate sovereignty".
